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THE STATE AND POLICY-MAKING IN APARTHEID'S SECOND PHASE
Deborah Posel
The literature on Apartheid and the Apartheid state pre-
'reform' is vast, but it devotes relatively little
attention to the mechanisms of power and decision-making
within the state, and their implications for the building
of Apartheid. Policy-making processes have remained
something of a black box; ideas inserted by the
architects of Apartheid policy seem simply to emerge as
law in much the same form as they went in. Conflicts
within and between state institutions over the course of
Apartheid have mostly been overlooked. And, although much
has been written about the capitalist interests 'behind'
state practices, far less is known about the exact roles
and powers of various capitalist actors within particular
state institutions.
These gaps in our understanding have much to do with the
common view of Apartheid as the systematic enactment of a
long-term 'grand design'. More often than not, this view
is not explicitly stated or argued; its presence is felt
as the dominant framework within which accounts of
Apartheid's development are constructed. Thus, a wide
range of literature on South Africa treats the making of
Apartheid as having been a fundamentally linear,
cumulative process, each step building on the successes of
the last.1 The National Party, the story goes, came to
power in 1948 with a ready-made, if rudimentary, policy
blueprint which directed state policy right up until the
onset of 'reform' in the 1970s. Initially too weak to
implement its more ambitious programmes of social
engineering, the Nationalist government steadily equipped
itself during the 1950s with the necessary resources and
powers. By the 1960s, most, if not all, the
Nationalists' long-standing plans, came to fruition. From
such a vantage point, the internal dynamics of the
Apartheid state seem relatively uninteresting, because the
notion of a 'grand plan' has already largely accounted for
the design and implementation of state policies.
There were, of course, important continuities in the
development of Apartheid; and the consolidation and
extension of state power was one of the striking features
of this process. But by the early 1960s, Apartheid had
shifted gear into a discrete, second phase, distinguished
by certain new premises and objectives, inaugurated in an
attempt to remedy the perceived failures of existing
policies. The 'grand plan1 explanatory paradigm is
therefore fundamentally misleading. And that being so, it
becomes all the more pertinent to examine the workings of
the Apartheid state more closely.
This paper focuses on two of the key discontinuities
between the first and second phases of Apartheid - the bid !M
Bantu Affairs Department (BAD) to restrict white "
dependence on African labour in the cities, and to remove
urbanised Africans' 'residential rights'. The paper
examines how and why these strategies were introduced by
the BAD, and the extent of the BAD's success in
translating its plans into law. In so doing, it is
shown that contrary to the conventional wisdom, the
making of Apartheid policy must be seen as a process of
ceaseless conflict, negotiation, compromise and change.2
1.
The policies introduced by the Native Affairs Department
(NAD) in the early 1950s grew from the
overriding conviction within the state that the
preservation of white supremacy did not necessitate 'total
segregation'3. The controlled expansion of the urban
African proletariat was accepted as an economic necessity,
which would not present serious political dangers provided
the state was suitably fortified against the threat of
urban insurrection. During the 1950s therefore, the
construction of Apartheid was marked on the one hand, by
the dramatic extension of the repressive powers of the
state, and on the other, by the adoption of what the NAD
considered a suitably 'practical' approach towards
Africans in urban areas.
Two key 'practical' premises underpinned the NAD's policy-
making. First, it was accepted that the state should
impose no political or ideological constraints on the
scale of 'economic integration* (ie. white dependence on
African labour) in the cities. Drban employers would be
entitled to stipulate how many African workers they
required. The size, and rate of growth, of the urban
African proletariat would thus be determined by the size
of the urban labour demand. The NAD would only intervene
to prevent the accummulation of 'large' labour 'surpluses'
in the cities. Second, the NAD's policy-makers accepted
that significant numbers of Africans had become de facto
permanent city-dwellers, having 'become detribalised and
'urbanised'.4 These people, it was argued, were entitled
to certain 'guarantees, security and stability'8, which
included protection from removal from the urban area in
which they lived if they became unemployed. Section
10(1) of the Natives (Urban) Areas Act (as amended in
1952), which formed the lynchpin of the NAD's urban
policy, thus divided the resident urban African
population rigidly into two groups. 'Urbanised' Africans
(in the state's sense of the term8) were allotted the
'residential right' to remain in a particular urban area
whether they were employed there or not. All remaining
city-dwellers would be treated as 'temporary sojourners'
liable to expulsion from the urban area in which they
lived once they ceased to 'minister to white needs'.7
By the end of the decade, however, the BAD was poised for
a radical overhaul of both its 'practical' premises.
Departmental officials complained that they exercised very
little control over the urban labour market. Contrary to
intention, urban labour 'surpluses' had grown, despite the
fact that the number of migrant workers recruited into the
cities from rural areas was also on the increase." To
make matters worse, the urban townships were still
cauldrons of political frustration and dissent, keeping
the bogey of the 'swart gevaar' very much alive in the
minds of state officials. By I960, urban African
resistance had escalated to the point where the entire
Afrikaner 'volk' was convinced that the bastions of whito
supremacy were being besieged, and urged that NAD policy
be thoroughly revised.
The wave of urban African protest which rose in the late
1950s drew its momentum partly from the shop floor.
Between 1955 and 1958, the number of industrial disputes
and people on strike nearly doubled over the levels of the
early 1950s.9 However, by 1959, the main thrust of
African protest came'from within the townships, beginning
with the squatter settlements of Cato Manor (outside
Durban) early in 1959. Initially provoked by opposition
to the state's plans to remove African squatters from the
Cato Manor area, the disturbances raged for several
months, inflamed by municipal raids on illegal beer
stills. By August 1959, the Manager of the Durban NEAD
called a meeting with the Minister of BAD to declare the
local authority's impotence and defeat in the Cato Manor
area.
The authority of the Durban City Council - the
civil governmental authority for the area - has
been challenged and overthrown. That statement
is not an exaggeration of the facts, for it is
true to say that the City Council has been
defeated at Cato Manor, and cannot restore its
authority without the fullest co-operation and
most active assistance of the Government.1-0
The tumult in Durban also made the headlines in the
overseas press. But this was a small sample of the more
severe and damaging international censure soon to come.
In December 1959, the PAC and ANC both unveiled plans for
national anti-pass campaigns. Their protests took an
unexpectedly dramatic turn in March 1960, when the South
African Police opened fire on a crowd of PAC protestors in
Sharpeville, Vereeniging. Sixty-nine people were killed
and 180 injured. As the unrest spread to other areas of
the country, a national state of emergency was declared,
and a political storm broke. With the injustices of
Apartheid now the subject of heated criticism abroad.
South Africa withdrew from the Commonwealth.
International confidence in the country's economic
prospects dived, and during 1960, the country suffered a
net outflow of R180 million" and a 'balance of payments
crisis more severe than any experienced since 1932".xa
As these political and economic crises dawned, the
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Afrikaner nationalist alliance was once again thrown into
turmoil over the long-controversial issues of 'economic
integration' and the status of urban Africans.
Disagreement on these matters, which had divided competing
conceptions of Apartheid in the late 1940s, had persisted
into the 1950s, albeit with less of the intensity than had
characterised the pre-election controversies. But by the
late 1950s, conflict had escalated once more, with the
Dutch Reformed Church and SABRA wracked by internal
divisions (see later). The Sharpeville crisis then fanned
the flames, spreading the heat throughout Afrikaner ranks.
Although this political blaze extended and perpetuated the
controversies of the previous decade, the lines of
division between competing factions which had
characterised the debates of the late 1940s, had now been
redrawn - with decisive implications for the direction and
tenor of BAD policy.
Responses to Sharpeville: Realignments within Afrikanerdom
and the BAD
The Sharpeville shootings produced a resounding clamour,
in South Africa and abroad, for 'liberal' reforms to the
government's policies towards Africans in the urban areas.
Some of these calls for reform emanated from within the
state. In early April 1960, three senior Cabinet
ministers - Donges, Sauer and Schoeman - discreetly urged
Verwoerd to do away with the reference book system.x3
Their request was sidelined by an assasination attempt on
Verwoerd on 9 April. But while Verwoerd was recovering in
hospital, Sauer (as acting Prime Minister) publicly called
for 'a new deal for the African' by way of a far-reaching
overhaul of the legislation affecting Africans in urban
areas. 'The old book of South African history was closed
at Sharpeville a month ago', declared Sauer; 'we must get
rid of the pinpricks which made the Native ripe for the
propoganda of the PAC and ANC'.1"
Sauer's pronouncements were echoed in several quarters of
Afrikanerdom. The Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut (AHI),
which had previously reserved its responses to government
policies for private, behind-the-scenes negotiations, now
made an overtly political intervention in the debate
about urban Africans. Alarmed at the rapid decline in the
country's appeal to foreign investors during the
Sharpeville crisis, the AHI acted unusually assertively,
taking the unprecedented step of aligning itself publicly
with the primarily English-speaking Federated Chamberof
Industries (FCI), Associated Chambers of Commerce
(ASSOCOM), Steel and Engineering Industries Federation of
South Africa (SEIFSA), and Transvaal and Orange Free State
Chambers of Mines. Recognising the Sharpeville
disturbances as having been provoked by 'genuine
grievances' on the part of urban Africans, these
organisations published a joint memorandum in July 1960,
of 'proposals to ease race tension'.15 These proposals
were based on 'the realistic observation'iB
that, owing to education, contact with a
developed economy etc., the Bantu can no longer
be regarded as belonging to a single
category....In large cities, there is a settled
urban Bantu population which it is desirable in
certain respects to treat differently from those
in the reserves.17
The memorandum thus called on the government to reform its
policies towards Africans living and working in the
cities, by drawing
a clear distinction.•.between the settled
urbanised Bantu who has resided for at least
five years in an urban area, and has thus
qualified for residence, and the migrant
labourer.10
By permitting urbanised Africans greater freedom of
movement and employment, it was argued, the government
could stabilise the townships by securing the support of a
'loyal middle-class type Bantu'.XB
The AHI, then, accepted the view of English-speaking
commerce and industry, that the antidote to urban African
resistance was an - extension of the existing
differentiation between urbanised and migrant residents of
the cities. Once the state's grip over the movements and
employment of urbanised Africans was loosened, it was
claimed, their sense of grievance would diminish.
The call for a co-optive strategy to ameliorate the plight
of urban Africans was also heard from dissident factions
within the Dutch Reformed Church (DRC) and SABRA.
Although initially an outspoken protagonist of 'total
segregation', by the mid-1950s the DRC had generally
thrown its weight behind the state's version of Apartheid.
A more liberal faction within the DRC, however, had begun
voicing criticism of the migrant labour system and its
disruptive effects on family life20. These murmurings
quickly grew louder dur.iiV) the Sharpeville crisis, issuing
in insistent pleas to review the effects of Apartheid on
urban Africans. 'Educated Christian Bantu individuals',
it was argued, should be viewed in a 'different light'
from Africans in the reserves21. A gathering of leading
Afrikaner churchmen in December 1960, the Cottesloe
Consultation, echoed this dissatisfaction with existing
Apartheid policies, calling for a review of the migrant
labour system, job reservation, and the appallingly low
wages and poor living conditions of urban Africans23.
A similar lobby was mounted by a minority faction within
SABRA. Its dissatisfaction with state policy was rooted
in a conflict with Verwoerd in the late 1950s over his
response to the findings of the Tomlinson Commission.
According to N.J. Olivier (a founder member of SABRA), the
Tomlinson Commission, briefed to examine the prospects for
the 'socio-economic development' of the reserves, was
appointed at SABRA's behest.33 Tomlinson, himself a
prominent SABRA figure, was joined by other leading SABRA
members in collecting and presenting the Commission's
findings. The report's findings were therefore couched in
the language of 'total segregation', which had
characterised SABRA's position on Apartheid in the late
1940s and early 1950s. Part of the Report's commitment to
'total segregation' was a call on the government to
develop the reserves into economically viable entities. A
figure of^l04 000 000 over ten years was estimated for
the task. Verwoerd however, as minister of the department
responsible for the reserves, refused to allocate such a
large sum of money.2* His plans for developing the
reserves were far more limited, aiming merely to contain
the African population which was 'surplus' to the labour
needs of 'white' areas. By the late 1950s, Verwoerd's
powers over SABRA had expanded to the point where the
dominant faction in the organisation had meekly succumbed
to his view, softening its stance on 'total segregation'.
The majority within SABRA now called merely for stricter
controls on African urbanisation and 'economic
integration', within a framework of the limited
development of the reserves. Only a minority group of
what John Lazar calls the 'visionaries' stood by the
original SABRA prescription for thorough-going 'total
segregation1.23 Conflict between the visionaries and the
SABRA mainstream which backed Verwoerd, came to a head at
the 1960 SABRA conference (held a month after the
Sharpeville massacres) which was dominated by debates over
the position of urban Africans. The 'visionaries',
recognising that Verwoerd's opposition to 'total
segregation' was unassailable, adopted an unexpectedly
and impermissibly - reformist stance. As long as the
government was not seriously committed to 'total
segregation1, they argued, the only effective bulwark
against continual turbulence in the townships was to
ameliorate the position and living conditions of urbanised
Africans. As Professor Joubert, a Transvaal executive
member, told the conference
thousands and thousands of Bantu with their
families are settled in our urban White areas.
To regard them as visitors or migrant labourers
would be, from a sociological point of view,
unrealistic...While they are there, life must be
made economically bearable for them.28
Ironically, the AHI's calls for the acceptance of an
economically integrated and perraamently settled urbanised
African community within 'white' South Africa, received
the backing of those who had once been the staunchest
exponents of 'total segregation'.
This reformist thrust within Afrikanderdom and the state
was blunted however, by the powers of the competing
faction, calling for an eradication of the distinction
between 'urbanised' and 'tribal' Africans. It was the
Broederbond, recently manouevred into a central policy-
making role by Verwoerd, which dominated this power bloc.
The 1950s had seen an impressive growth in the size and
influence of the Bond, its membership increasing from
3 662 in 260 cells in 1950, to 5 760 in 409 cells by
I960.37 As the decade advanced, the organisation had
become increasingly active in the ideological and cultural
activities of Afrikanerdom. The Bond also exercised
considerable influence within the public service,
provoking frequent allegations that promotion for civil
servants depended on their securing Broederbond
patronage.20 Still, before the late 1950s, the
Broederbond was largely excluded from the sphere of party
politics and policy-making.29 It was Verwoerd's
successful bid for leadership of the NP in 1958 that
brought the Bond into the forefront of political decision-
making, as a quid pro quo for its support of Verwoerd in
the leadership contest30. Verwoerd's standing in the NP
had reached its nadir in 1957. Strongly criticised for
his autocratic ways, Verwoerd had indicated his wish to
resign his portfolio as Minister of Native Affairs31. But
in 1958 he rebounded triumphant, with the backing of the
Broederbond, and defeated T.E. Donges1 bid to succeed J.
Strijdom as leader of the NP and Prime Minister.
Initially however, Verwoerd's position as Prime Minister
was fragile, buffetted by strong opposition from the Cape
NP particularly. In order to bolster his power, he
therefore rapidly inserted four staunch supporters, all
prominent Broeders (N. Diedrichs, A. Hertzog, W. Maree, D.
Uys), into the Cabinet. More secure in the Cabinet, and
assured of the loyalty of the Broederbond, Verwoerd then
proceeded to expand the Broederbond's powers within the
state, as an extension and instrument of his own hold over
the course of state policy. Addressing a national
meeting of the Broederbond shortly after his election in
1958, Verwoerd announced plainly,
I did not see it only as my privilege but as my
duty to draw the ties close - the ties that
always existed between our Afrikaner
organisation [the Bond] and our Afrikaner
government - through my personal presence.32
As Lazar has argued, Verwoerd looked to the Bond
'increasingly... as an informal Cabinet'.33
The Bond's extensive, well-knit organisational
networks, and deep penetration of all Afrikaner
institutions, became an indispensable weapon in
Verwoerd's armoury, because he was able to
bypass the normal political channels whenever he
considered it necessary.3*
Poised at the helm of policy-making, the Broederbond was
able to play a key role in marginalising the reformist
lobby within Afrikanderdom. By the late 1950s, leading
Broeders occupied top positions in the DRC, which they
used to discredit the position taken by the Cottesloe
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Consultation and to pressure churchmen into distancing
themselves from its recommendations.38 Overlapping
membership of the Broedeijbond and SABRA allowed
Broederbond members to spearhead the offensive against the
SABRA 'visionaries' too.30 The visionaries' calls for
reformist urban policies had plunged the 1960 SABRA annual
conference into 'an atmosphere of crisis'37. These
conflicts persisted until the next annual SABRA conference
in 1961, when the pro-Verwoerdian faction in the
organisation succeeded in trouncing the 'visionaries' as
the conference drew to a close, by mounting a coup of all
the office-bearing positions in the organisation.3B
By 1960, the SAAU too was in the throes of Broederbond
infiltration.38 The Bond's foray into the Afrikaans
agricultural community40 was strongly opposed in some
quarters. As an internal Broederbond circular of 1976
admitted, 'committees of organised agriculture had been
captured many years ago with great difficulty and
sacrifice'*1. The strength of feeling amongst Afrikaner
farmers in the northern Orange Free State, for example,
was sufficient to launch an alternative organisation 'to
fight the Broederbond secret society and eradicate it from
Afrikaner life'.*2 But this move was itself an indication
of the power which the Bond had already established
within local farmers' organisations. The Broederbond's
'tight grip' on agriculture*3 was also facilitated by its
hold over several of the agricultural co-operatives
affiliated to, and powerful within, the SAAU**. The co-
operatives played a key role in assuring farmers'
survival, by providing production loans needed by most
farmers to buy fertiliser, fuel and seed. The officials
and directors of the co-operatives also allocated loans
from the Land Bank, for farm purchases or extensions. (In
1959, £32.5 million was loaned to farmers by the Land
Bank, and £320 869 paid out for seed, fuel, etc.*s) By
using their powers to assure that fellow Broeders secured
better loans than non-Broeders, Broederbond members in
office-bearing positions in the co-operatives were able to
extend their influence and support within the co-
operatives and the SAAU at large.*8
The newfound political ascendancy of the Broederbond had
profound implications for the tenor of BAD policy-making.
By the late 1950s, the three key decision-makers in the
Department - Minister D. De Wet Nel, Deputy Minister M.C.
Botha and Secretary W. Eiselen - were all Broeders and
central figures in the the dominant faction within SABRA.
SABRA's pro-Broederbond leanings were also manifest in the
BAD through its research division and the Native Affairs
Commission*7, both dominated by SABRA members. Also, the
SAAU's continuing prominence and influence in the BAD gave
the Bond another lever within the Department. As a
consequence of its infiltration by the Broederbond, the
SAAD shifted its position on African urbanisation, to
coincide with that taken by the Bond. During the late
1940s and early 1950s, the AHI and SAAU had shared a
common commitment to 'practical' Apartheid.*8 But by
1960, while the AHI remained resolutely 'practical', the
SAAU had become increasingly wary of policies which
unwittingly increased the size and bargaining power of the
urban African proletariat.
This new alliance of interests made its mark within the
BAD soon after the Sharpeville disturbances. A 'liason
committee' comprising representatives from the SAAU and
BAD, established in 1944, had enjoyed a privileged hearing
within the BAD since the late 1940s. Soon after the
Sharpeville shootings, this committee met with leading
figures in the Department to draft legislation which
would considerably extend the degree of state control over
Africans in urban areas.4'. The bill which emerged from
these discussions - the 'Bantu in European Areas Bill'
was circulated confidentially in October 1960 to local
authorities, organised commerce and industry and other
interested parties, for their urgent attention.
The contents of this Bill, far more draconian than
anything previously drafted by the BAD, illustrated
plainly that from the BAD's point of view, the explosion
of urban resistance was caused by too little statn
control, rather than too much. In a bid to tighten the
state's grip on the urban proletariat, the BAD rapidly
overturned the two principal 'practical' premises which
had underpinned its urban policy in the 1950s.
The BAD's policy-makers were now extremely concerned
that 'economic integration' was Apartheid's Achilles heel.
As the then Minister of BAD, D. De Wet Nel put it, 'if
Apartheid should fail, it would probably be due to
uncontrolled economic integration'.50 By having allowed
industrial dependence on African labour to proceed
unchecked, it was argued, the state was now sitting on a
political time-bomb. To defuse it, the BAD would have to
enfringe urban employers' freedom to determine the size of
their African workforce. In a radical departure from the
policy of the previous decade, the 1960 Bantu in European
Areas Bill therefore announced that for the first time,
the scale of urban African employment would be restricted
by
the fixing of labour quotas or labour pools in
respect of certain areas or categories of
employment or in respect of individual
employers, control of the movement of labour in
accordance with such quotas or from such pools
and the prohibition of employment other than
such as determined in accordance with such
quotas or from any source other than such labour
pools.31
No provision was made to set these quotas in consultation
with employer bodies; the decision would be wholly in the
hands of state officials.
The 1960 Bill also signalled the BAD's reversal of its
previous acceptance of the 'reality1 of 'detribalisation1.
The view now dominant in the Department was that in order
to subvert the threat of further protest, far more
drastic steps would have to be taken to curtail the growth
of the urban workforce, which included removing the
'guarantees, security and stability' of the urbanised
proletariat.
The BAD's change of tack regarding 'residential rights'
was part of a more general ideological and policy shift,
first manifest in the decision to transform the 'reserves'
into 'self-governing homelands'. During the 1950s, the
reserves had been treated essentially as reservoirs of
labour at the disposal of whites. The commitment to
'separate development' was largely the ideological means
to legitimise the denial of the vote to Africans living
in the country. The reserves were defined as the
permanent political 'home' of all Africans, as a means of
excluding them from the polity of 'white' South Africa.
But Africans had no political rights within the reserves.
With the promulgation of the Bantu Self-Government Act in
1959, however, 'separate development' was vaunted as a
means of allocating Africans the right to 'ethnic self-
determination' in 'self-governing homelands'.
This new discourse of 'ethnic self-determination' made for
a redefinition of the status and identity of urban
Africans. BAD ideologues now poured scorn on their
earlier view that large numbers of Africans in the cities
had become 'detribalised'. Once accepted as the 'reality'
which Apartheid had to accommodate, 'detribalisation1 was
now pronounced a myth. Stressing the underlying ethnic
unity of Africans in the urban and rural areas, the BAD
expressly rejected the idea that there were 'two kinds of
Africans'52, those who were urbanised and those who
retained ties with the reserves. As Eiselen (Secretary
for Bantu Affairs) explained in 1959, 'our policy only
recognises one Bantu community in its ethnic
subdivisions'.33 Or, as M.C. Botha (then Minister of
BAD) put it in later years.
The Bantu in the white urban areas cannot be
dissected from their national relatives in the
homelands, not even if they were born here in
the white area. The Bantu in the white urban
areas and those in the Bantu homelands are
linked together into one nation by bonds of
language - perhaps the most important ties
descent, kinship, tradition, tribal relations,
customs, pride, material interests and many
other matters. The national consciousness of
the Bantu is more deeply rooted than many people
realise and are prepared to accept.5*
Section 10 'rights', which had been premised on the
differentiation between 'two kinds of Africans', were
thus denounced as an indefensible 'deviation' from the
principles of 'separate development1.55 Whereas the
lo
purpose of 'separate development' was to allocate Africans
their 'own sphere' in their 'ethnic' homelands, argued the
BAD, section 10(1) had 'granted permanence...to Bantu...in
European areas.156
The BAD therefore set out to re-route its urban policy,
by levelling the status of all Africans in the cities.
All would be treated as mere visitors, there for the
purpose of meeting white economic needs. The Bantu in
European Areas Bill thus accorded the Minister of BAD
the power to stipulate when 'the number of Bantu...in an
area is in excess of the area's labour requirements', and
provided for the removal of those persons deemed
'excessive'." The Bill stated specifically that section
10 'rights' were was no protection against removal:
any Bantu born in the area concerned or having
unconditional residence therein may also be
removed."
The Bill provoked a storm of protest. Many local
authorites took strong exception to the labour quota
system because it usurped their existing powers to
determine the scale of industrial development in their
areas of jurisdiction.BO Organised commerce and industry
firmly reiterated the stand taken in the 1960 'Proposals
to Ease Racial Tensions' (see earlier) that the
differentiation between urbanised and 'tribal' Africans
should be accentuated, not weakened. And the idea of
labour quotas was strongly condemned as 'completely
against free enterprise...(one which) must be resisted to
the uppermost"0'.
The BAD hastily backed down, abandoning the Bill in toto
without even having it gazetted. But the Bill's contents
signposted the direction of the Department's strategies
for the next 12 or so years. And the fate of the bill
presaged the conflicts and compromises which would beset
the policy-making process throughout this period. The
following section briefly examines the powers of the BAD,
and the extent to which these were checked by opposition
from local authorities and the urban business community,
to both a labour quota system and the removal of section
10 'rights'.
2.
The BAD's determined bid to impose its will was
orchestrated and propelled by the large and powerful
Departmental bureaucracy. Already unwieldy by the end of
the 1950s, the BAD's bureaucracy continued to expand
throughout the 1960s. By 1968, it comprised no less than
seven sub-departments: agriculture and development;
housing; departmental administration; labour and
identification; community affairs;• and land and finance.
'Bantu affairs' in 'white' South Africa as well as in the
homelands were wholly in the control of the BAD. As the
Department grew, so too did its self-sufficiency and
authority within the state. Other state departments
seldom participated in the BAD's decision-making, even in
matters of mutual concern. For example, in 1967, when the
BAD's Director of Labour, P. Van Rensburg, chaired an
inquiry into existing control measures, including the
control of African labour, the Department of Labour was
not invited to participate in the inquiry.
As the BAD expanded, so too did the degree of support for
the Broederbond and SABRA amongst the Department's
personnel.01 The influence of SABRA within the
Departmental bureaucracy had been established in the early
1950s, when Verwoerd (as Minister of Native Affairs)
created an internal research division staffed wholly by
SABRA members, to brief the Ministry on policy issues. As
the Department and its research division expanded, so too
had the number of SABRA members within it. The
Broederbond's foothold in the BAD was similarly long-
standing. As mentioned previously, throughout the 1950s,
the Broederbond had pursued a strategy of inserting its
members as widely as possible into the civil service. The
'Native affairs' bureaucracy was deemed a particularly
important sphere of influence. It has been alleged that
by the 1960s, most, if not all, the powerful positions
within the BAD bureaucracy were filled by Broederbond
members02.
The size and composition of the BAD bureaucracy had
important implications for the nature of Departmental
policy. Departmental legislation was drafted by
bureaucrats03, who thus had enormous scope to set the
policy-making agenda (even if some of their schemes were
later scotched or modified by opposition from the minister
or the Cabinet). The attempt to remove section 10
'rights' from the statute book (discussed in more detail
later) was a case in point. The memorandum accompanying
the 1959 Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Bill had made
it clear that opposition to the principle underpinning
section 10 'rights' was official government policy. But
it was the BAD's bureaucrats who selected and instigated
particular forms of attack. F.B. Du Randt (who replaced
Van Rensburg as Director of Labour in 1968) said as much
in a meeting with organised commerce and industry in 1968
to discuss the draft Bantu Labour Amendment Bill.
Explaining why the bill contained a clause scrapping
section 10 'rights' altogether, Du Randt said
he had included it in the Bill because he felt
very strongly on this issue, and hoped that by
doing so, the Department would be able to get
some reaction from responsible people in order
to establish more or less how the wind blew."
The minister always had the final say, but the BAD's
officials had considerable powers to shape ministerial
thinking itself, by controlling the flow of information in
the Department. For example, the minister relied to a
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considerable extent on the knowledge and opinion of his
bureaucratic staff, to interpret the large labyrinth of
laws and regulations on 'Bantu affairs'. Also,
recommendations or complaints about Departmental policy
from local authorities, capitalist lobbies or other non-
governmental sources, were processed by bureaucrats, who
chose whether or not to refer the matter to the minister.
In the case of the business community, all communications
on labour matters were dealt with by the BAD's sub-
department of Labour, headed by a succession of notorious
hard-liners."5 According to S.B. Bourquin (past manager
of Durban's municipal Non-European Affairs Department),
the BAD's bureaucrats increasingly took decisions,
received and replied to correspondence, wholly at their
own initiative."5 This direct intervention by officials
became all the more common as the Department expanded,
becoming 'far too top-heavy for the minister to keep
control187.
The power of the BAD's bureaucracy was fostered too, by
the fact that during the 1960s, ministerial positions
were occupied by a series of men who shared the same
fundamental approach to Apartheid as their leading
bureaucrats. M.C. Botha, a leading SABRA member and
Broeder, became Minister in 1966, with Blaar Coetzee -
another Broederbond member - as his deputy. Piet
Koornhof, who had replaced Coetzee by 1968, had similar
political and ideological credentials. This basic
ideological consensus probably allowed the ministry to
feel reasonably safe in accepting the bureaucracy's
considerable autonomy.
The BAD's powers were not uncontested, however.
Ironically, the BAD was at its most rigid and
uncompromising at the same time as economic growth was
reaching spectacular new heights, generating enormous
urban demands for labour. Between 1963 and 1968 the GDP
at current prices rose by an annual average of 9.3%
(compared with an average of 5.2% from 1957-1962.)BS The
growth of the manufacturing and construction sectors
both concentrated in urban areas - was principally
responsible for this boom." The BAD was proposing to
curb 'economic integration' at exactly the moment that the
economic costs of restricting industry's labour supply
were increasing dramatically, along with the political
bargaining power of organised industry and commerce.70
The stage was set, therefore, for a bitter battle.
Another influential constituency profoundly affected by
the BAD's strategies was the municipal departments of
'Non-European affairs' (NEADs). Structurally, the
interests of municipal officials concerned with 'urban
bantu administration' were radically ambiguous. They were
employed by, and therefore directly answerable to, elected
town or city councils (which may or may not have been
dominated by the NP). But their job was to implement BAD
policy at a local level, and they could be removed from
office by the BAD if its instructions were not followed.
II-
To compound matters, municipalities had their own
specific interests and agendas, determined to a large
extent by growing budgetary constraints, particularly in
the provision of African housing.
These tensions were thrown into sharp relief by the BAD's
strategy of imposing urban labour quotas. The elected
local authorities had a direct vested interest in the
expansion of local business. Not only did it boost the
employment prospects and general economic prosperity of
their areas; local capitalists were also influential
members of the community which elected the local
authority. And the rates paid by urban businesses made a
substantial contribution to the local authorities'
coffers. However, economic expansion invariably
accelerated the demand for African housing, often beyond
the muncipality's financial means. The positions taken by
municipal officials on the labour quota issue varied,
depending on their particular assessment of their
overriding interests. For many, particularly those which
had been throughly infiltrated and colonised by the
Broederbond, the imperatives of BAD policy came first.
But for most of the larger municipalities (such as
Johanensburg, Durban and Cape Town), labour quotas were
regarded as an unnecessary irritant to the local economy.
The BAD could ill-afford to ignore the views of the
municipalities. The Institute of Administrators of Non-
European Affairs, comprising the managers of municipal
NEADs, was an invaluable reservoir of expertise and
experience in matters of urban adminstration. And,
although the BAD had succeeded during the 1950s in
trimming the powers of municipal officers71-, their co-
operation remained essential for the effective
implementation of Departmental policy72.
The fate of the BAD's bid to rewrite the law during the
1960s lay largely in the outcome of the three-cornered
contests between the Department, urban business community
and local authorities.73
Struggles over the Scale of 'Economic Integration'.
The BAD was divided over the appropriate corrective to
'uncontrolled economic integration'. Some leading BAD
officials favoured the wholesale 'removal of Bantu labour
from urban areas1.7* But neither De Wet Nel nor Botha
advocated such extreme measures. When the 1963 Transvaal
congress of the NP appealed to the government to give
'final execution to its policy of Apartheid no matter what
the sacrifices1,78 De Wet Nel was unsympathetic. His
reply stressed the fact that without some measure of
dependence on African labour 'our mines and industries
would come to a complete standstill'.76 The BAD was
unanimous however, in stressing the need to place legal
curbs on the scale of 'economic integration' in the
cities.
It took t.he BAD seven years to realise its goals. The
first attempt to impose labour quotas, after the demise of
the Bantu in European Areas Bill, was contained in the
1963 Bantu Laws Amendment Bill. It provided inter alia,
for 'the limitation of the number of Bantu who may work or
reside in an urban area1, by 'fixing the ration which
Bantu labour should bear to any other classes of labour in
the area'.77 But once again, it was principally
opposition from organised business which sank the
relevant clause. The Johannesburg Chamber of Commerce
noted with satisfaction that
from a study of the 1964 Bill, which had now
passed its second reading, it seems that many
of the objections made by the employer bodies
during 1963 have now been met.70
The BAD was undeterred, however. Deputy Minister Blaar
Coetzee issued a stern warning to the business community
in 1966 that 'the government (was) in deadly earnest'
about restricting the 'flow of Bantu labour to the
Witwatersrand'.7S> If employers could not 'find the
necessary formulae ...to restrict their employment of
Bantu to the absolute minimum', he insisted, ' it will be
the duty of the Government' to do so a o. And so it did,
with the introduction of the Physical Planning and
Utilisation of Resources Bill (1967), designed to 'peg or
reduce (the number) of Bantu workers employed in industry
outside the Bantu areas'01. In terms of the bill,
industrialists would have to secure governmental
permission before establishing or extending factories in
urban areas.
The provisions of this bill fell within the newly created
Planning Ministry's sphere of operation. It was
therefore the Minister of Planning who introduced and
defended the bill in parliament. Yet, it was the BAD wh'.cJ-v
had instigated and compiled the bill, on the grounds that
the measure had important implications for the labour
bureaux system.sa The Minister of Planning, it seems,
simply went along with the BAD's proposal.
The Bill provoked strong protests from organised commerce
and industry. ASSOCOM called it 'the most drastic control
to be introduced in South Africa in times of peace133, and
together with the FCI, called on the government to drop
the bill forthwith. Their concern was echoed within the
Prime Minister's Economic Advisory Council, most of its
members opposed to compulsory restrictions on industrial
development.0* But the Minister of Planning informed
commerce and industry that 'the Cabinet had decided the
principle of the Bill would be enacted'03, and the Bill
was duly passed. The only concession secured by business
pressure was an amendment which limited the factory
'extensions' in question to 'an increase in the number of
Bantu employees'. But restrictions on African employment
were after all, the BAD's principal purpose in introducing
the bill.
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The application of the Physical Planning Act was in the
hands of the Minister of Planning, whose attitude to
employers was less intransigent than the line typically
taken by the BAD. After a meeting with ASSOCOM, FCI, AHI,
SEIFSA and others, to discuss the new measure, the
Minister announced that the scope of the law would be
narrowed, to apply only to the PWV area. Western Cape,
Port-Elizabeth/Uitenhage area, and all land not already
zoned for industrial development.08 The minister also
gave the reassurance that the implementation of the law
'would have to evolve in the light of experience gained,
and in accordance with the dictates of circumstances'.37
But he would not go so far as to establish structures for
'continuous consultation'ea with the business community to
monitor the economic effects of the policy.
The BAD's sub-department of Labour kept a keen eye on the
implementation of the Physical Planning Act, in a bid to
check that the policy of restricted 'economic integration1
stayed on course. But officials from the the Planning
Department firmly reminded the BAD that the Act was not
the BAD's direct concern.00
The Department of Planning might have spared employers the
worst excesses of the BAD's designs. But the basic thrust
of the BAD's policy of limiting 'economic integration' in
'white' urban areas, remained intact. Thus, in 1970, the
government's White Paper on the 'Report by the Inter-
Departmental Committee on the Decentralisation of
Industries' authorised the implementation of labour quotas
(initially only on the Witwatersrand). The maximum
permissible ratio of White to African industrial workers
in the region was to be pegged at 1:2.5 (until 1973) and
thereafter, at 1:2. Any industry exceeding the quota
would be compelled to decentralise to a border area or
reserve.
Struggles over Section 10 'rights'.
The BAD's onslaught on urban 'residential rights' was as
determined, if less successful, than the drive to impose
labour quotas. Most, if not all, the draft legislation
of the 1960s affecting urban Africans, contained a clause
setting out to erode or remove section 10 'rights'. And
in all cases, the relevent clause was dropped before the
bill became law.
The BAD was adamant about removing section 10, not simply
to eliminate the ideological anomaly of a class of urban
Africans with de facto permanent status in 'white' areas.
Section 10 'rights' were a real and major obstacle in the
way of the BAD's efforts to control the urban labour
market and limit the growth of the urban proletariat as
far as possible. As long as Section 10 stayed on the
statute books, adminstrators would have to accommodate
growing urban labour 'surpluses' at the same time as an
expanding migrant workforce.00
Legislation was introduced in February 1963, in line with
the recommendations of an interdepartmental inquiry into
'unemployment and idleness among the urban Bantu' in 1962,
headed by the BAD's deputy minister, M.C. Botha. The 1963
Bantu Laws Amendment Bill introduced a clause which would
overrule urban 'residential rights' by empowering the BAD
to remove all unemployed Africans from urban areas,
irrespective of their status in terms of section 10.
Business reaction was swift. Not only was the BAD trying
to pare down the size of the urban labour reservoir; the
proposed law also threatened to undermine the
'stabilisation' of urban labour.81 The industrial boom of
the 1960s, accompanied by the accelerating capital-
intensification of manufacturing, boosted the urban
demand for semi-skilled labour. The more 'stable' the
workforce, employer organisations pointed out, the more
cost-effective the training process. Section 10 'rights'
were regarded as important source of 'stability' in the
workforce, because these 'rights' allowed workers to live
in the cities with their families on a permanent basis."2
The BAD responded equally promptly. By May, a new draft
of the Bill had been circulated, which omitted the
offending provision.
Its resolve apparently strengthened by this defeat, the
BAD next proposed an even more drastic move. In 1967, Van
Rensburg chaired a departmental inquiry into 'existing
control measures', which recommended the wholesale-
removal of section 10 from the statute books. Vindicated
by Van Rensburg's findings, Du Randt drafted the 1968
Bantu Labour Amendment Bill, setting out to scrap section
10. Africans' presence in urban areas would become
entirely dependent on their being employed there.
Recognising that the bill's fate was strongly affected by
the responses of organised commerce and industry83, Du
Randt tried to bribe support with the promise of
legislation to enlarge prescribed areas . As the FCI
reported,
the Transvaal Chamber [of Industries] has,
confidentially, been advised that it could
probably secure the integration of the
Witwatersrand, or at least portions of the
Witwatersrand, as a Bantu labour area, if it
would support the removal of the so-called
section 10(1) residential rights of Bantu so
that the sole test of a Bantu's right to reside
in an urban area would be whether there was work
for him in that area.'3
The FCI and ASSOCOM had long complained that the influx
control system obstructed the mobility of African labour
across areas which ought to have functioned economically
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as single units. The influx control laws permitted an
African to live and work within one particular 'prescribed
area', defined by municipal boundaries. Permits or
'residential rights' to live and work in one prescribed
area were not valid in another, which meant that workers
who were 'legally' resident in one area usually resisted
moves by employers to transfer their workforce across
municipal boundaries. Despite Du Randt's promise to
address this problem, however, the FCI reiterated its
opposition to any tampering with section 10 'rights'.
Fear of industrial 'unrest' was the principal reason. As
FCI representatives explained in a meeting with Du Randt,
employers and others had been very successful in
dampening down upsets in the Bantu labour force
and on these grounds an appeal (was made) not to
introduce the topic of section 10...Government
policy was fully understood but there might bn
other ways of assisting in the implementation of
the policy but not in such a violent manner as
was envisaged by the proposed legislation.Ba
This nervousness about- upsetting the uneasy political calm
of the 1960s, was shared within IANA. As Carr (manager of
Johannesburg's NEAD) put it,
the one fatal mistake you can make in our sort
of work is to promise the Bantu a thing, then go
back on your word. That you can't do because you
destroy the basis of trust which exists between
us....there has never been, in all my years of
experience, a better relationship between the
Bantu population and the white population, that
exists at the moment. And this is not a thing
that we must lightly imperil or jeopardise."7
Yet again, the BAD backed down, and Section 10(1)
remained on the statute book. But the BAD succeeded in
whittling down the substance of urban 'residential rights'
in less direct ways. With tacit support from the business
community8", the so-called 'call-in card system1 was
introduced, making it compulsory for migrant workers to
return annually to their districts of origin. This
precluded the possibility of a migrant notching up the ten
or fifteen years of continuous service in a proclaimed
area necessary for the acquisition of 10(1)(b) 'rights'.
The most brutal blow to section 10 'rights' was levelled
by the BAD's urban removals policy. Initiated as a
national policy in 1961, this policy grew more
aggressive as the decade wore on. In some cases, entire
townships were relocated on the other side of homeland
boundaries; but in urban areas too distant from any of the
homelands, the BAD concentrated on removing thousands of
individuals classed as 'non-productive'. The definition
of this category grew progressively broader. By the late
1960s, it encompassed all Africans who were 'not regarded
as essential for the European labour market1io°
irrespective of their status in terras of section 10.
It appears that the BAD's sideways attacks on section 10
met with little sustained opposition. Organised commerce
and industry .seem not to have paid much attention to the
urban removals policy.loi And many of the local
authorities were strongly in favour of the BAD's urban
removals policy, to the point of growing impatient with
what they perceived as BAD's lethargy in implementing its
plans.102
Despite these gains, the frontal assault on Section 10
continued, although the BAD now reassessed its strategy.
Taking note of the "whole chorus of protest'103 which
greeted their plans, BAD bureaucrats decided that they
could not do away with the 'very dearly held rights'10*
attached to section 10 without putting something else in
their place.103 The policy of homeland citizenship, seen
by the BAD as giving fullest expression yet to its policy
of anchoring urban Africans in homelands, set this new
campaign in motion. In terms of the 1970 Homeland
Citizenship Act, all Africans - irrespective of where they
were born - would.be forced to take out citizenship of
one or other self-governing or independent homeland.
Possession of Section 10 'rights' was not directly
affected by the law. But the BAD planned to dilute, and
eventually undermine, the importance attached to these
'rights' by allocating superior benefits and privileges to
homeland citizens. Possession of homeland citizenship
would become a prerequisite for urban employment as well
as for access to urban housing.106 These proposals wera
still-born, however. Section 10 'rights' remained intact,
until the abolition of influx control in 1986.
The failure of the BAD's onslaught on section 10 in the
1970s was one of the casualties of the transition to the
third 'reformist1 phase of Apartheid, which had its
origins in the early 1970s. By then, a more pragmatic
faction within the state, which questioned some of the
existing principles of Apartheid, was beginning to assert
its authority. This reformist impulse was carried into
the BAD, with the appointment of Punt Janson as its Deputy
Minister - a strategic move by Vorster designed to check
the power of the BAD's ideologues.107 But these
realignments take the discussion beyond the scope of this
paper.
Conclusion
This paper has concentrated on the internal workings of
the BAD during the 1960s, as illustrated by the fate of
the two strategies which epitomised the shift from the
first to the second phase of Apartheid. A number of more
general points have emerged from this discussion. The
making of Apartheid was not wholly linear or cumulative,
in the manner suggested by much of the literature. Nor
was the transition to a second phase of policy-making
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prefigured in any pre-existing plan. It is explained
largely by realignments within Afrikanerdom during the
late 1950s, manifest in response to the escalation of
urban African protest. Furthermore, this policy shift was
strongly contested, within and beyond the state,
throughout Apartheid's second phase. The substance of
state policy during this period therefore cannot be
regarded as the instrument of any one set of interests;
instead, it reflected the outcome of continuing conflicts
and compromises. Even when the BAD was at the zenith of
its power, redrawing the very map of the country, it
remained unable to rewrite the influx control laws in the
manner it preferred.
The paper also belies simplistic formulations that state
policy either did or did not further particular class
interests. The political powers of manufacturing and
commercial capital were essentially uneven. Strong enough
to subvert the BAD's schemes to eradicate section 10
'rights', the urban business lobby failed to deter the
BAD in its quest for limits on the scale of 'economic
integration' in the cities.
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